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HERRINGTON v. VILLAGE OF LANSINGBURGH.
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HERRINGTON v VILLAGE OF LANSINGBURGH.
A municipal corporation is not liable to the owner of a team for an injury
suffered whilst endeavoring to control his horses, who had been frightened by
a blast fired in a neighboring street by a contractor engaged in constructing a
sewer, under a contract providing for the entire control of the work, and also
the payment, by the contractor, of all damage arising from the necessary
blasting.
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June 19, 1888. The defendant is a municipal
EARL, J.
corporation, and by its charter is clothed with power to cause
the construction of sewers. On the 23d day of October,
1878, it made and entered into a contract in writing with
Broderick & Ellis for the construction of a sewer in and
through one of its streets called "State Street." The specifications for the work provided that all damage arising from
blasting to be done in the construction of the sewer should
be paid for by the contractors. State Street crossed Market
Street at right angles. On the 7th of December, 1878, the
plaintiff came into the village with a team, and tied his
horses to a post in Market Street, about fifteen feet from State
Street, in front of a grocery, and went into the grocery, and
while there the contractors fired a blast in State Street, which
frightened the team. The plaintiff rushed from the grocery,
and, while attempting to control the team, was severely injured. The place where the blast was fired was about two
hundred feet from Market Street, and the team where it was
fastened in Market Street was not visible from the place of
the blasting. The claim of the plaintiff is that the defendant is responsible to him for the injury he sustained in consequence of the frightening of the horses by the blast. At
the place where the horses were fastened the street was in

HERRINGTON v. VILLAGE OF LANSINGBURGH.

perfect condition, and the horses did not become restless or
frightened from anything existing in the street, and the accident was in no way caused by any imperfect condition of the
street, but simply by noise resulting from the blast. If there
was any culpable carelessness which caused the injury to the
plaintiff, it was that of the contractors. They had entire
control of the work, and the manner of its performance.
They could choose their own time for firing the blasts, and
select their own agents and instrumentality. They could
make the charges of powder large or small, and they could
in some degree smother the blasts, so es to prevent falling
rocks, and much of the noise of the explosion, or they could
carelessly omit all precautions, and for the consequences of
their negligence they alone would be responsible. If it was
a prudent thing to notify persons in the vicinity of the blast
before it was fired, then the contractors should have given
the notice; but the duty to give it did not devolve upon the
village. And for these conclusions the cases of Pack v. Mayor,
ete., 8 N. Y. 222; Kelly v. Mayor, etc., 11 Id. 432, and McCafferty v. Railroad Co., 61 Id. 178, are ample authority. It is
conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that if
the plaintiff bad been hit by a fragment of rock thrown by
the blast the defendant would not have been, and the contractors alone would have been, responsible. So, too, if a
fragment of rock bad struck one of the horses, or had fallen
or passed near them, and thus had frightened them, causing
the injury to the pjaintiff, within the authorities cited, the
defendant would not have been responsible, and for precisely
the same reason no responsibility rests upon it because the
team was frightened by the noise of the explosion. A rule
which would cast responsibility upon the defendant for injuries resulting from the noise of the explosion, and exempt it
from responsibility for injuries caused by fragments of rock
thrown by the explosion, would rest upon no rational basis;
and require distinctions too fine for the practical administration of justice. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except
FORT,

J., dissenting.
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1. When counsel for the appellant
conceded "that, if the plaintiff had
been hit by a fragment of rock thrown
by the blast, the defendant would not
have been, and the contractor alone
would have been, responsible," the
Court condemned the distinction between a liability arising from the
noise made and one caused by a flying fragment of a rock.
In Indiana a statute provided that
a city "shall have exclusive power
over the streets, highways, alleys,"
etc., "within such city." Another
statute authorized such city "to conduct and establish works for furnishing the city with wholesome water,
and for the purpose of drainage of
such city, may go beyond the city
limits, and condemn lands and materials, and exercise full jurisdiction
and all the necessary power therefor;
or the common council may authorize
any incorporated company or association to construct such works, and in
such case the city may become part
stockholder in any such company or
association;" * * * "the common
council shall have power to enforce
ordinances" for such purpose. So,
by statute, the city had power to enforce ordinances "to prevent the incumbering of streets, squares, sidewalks, and crossings with vehicles,
or any other substance or materials
whatever, interfering with the free use
of the same." In still another statute it is provided that a company may
be formed "for the construction of
waterworks in and for incorporated
cities," and that "it shall be the duty
of the common council of the city in
or for which such company may propose to erect waterworks, by resolution duly passed and entered upon its
minutes, to grant to such company
such right to the use of the streets,
alleys, wharves, and public grounds
of such city as shall be necessary to

enable such cpmpany to construct the
proper works for the supply of water
for the use of such city and its inhabitants: Provided, That the common council of such city may, in such
grant, impose such just and reasonable terms, restrictions and limitations
upon such company, in reference to
the manner in which such streets,
alleys, wharves, and public grounds
are to be used * ** as shall be necessary to guard against the improper
use of such streets, alleys, wharves,
and public grounds."
While the provisions of these statutes were in force, the city of Logausport undertook, itself, the construction of waterworks within its boundaries, and let out the contract therefor.
The works were not constructed by
nor owned by an incorporated company but by the city; and the assignor of the contract for their construction contracted directly with the
city. One Dick was killed by a flying fragment of a rock, thrown carelessly by means of a blast, in or near
the street, under charge of the assignee of the contractor, and the city
was held liable: The City of Logansport v. Dick, 70 Ind. 65.
The statutes quoted imposed nothing more than the common-law duty,
to keep the streets in safe condition
and inflicted no more liability fdr neglect in this respect than the commonlaw liability, where that liability is
recognized. The Court stated the
facts as follows: "The special findings of the jury showed, among other
things, that, after its adoption of a
system of waterworks for municipal
purposes, the appellant (the city) entered into a written contract with onb
D. A. Chappel for the erection and
completion of said works for a specific
sum of money ; that this contract was
assigned by said Chappel to the defendant Smith, and by said Smith to
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the defendant Farrington, prior to the
execution of the work and to the
death of John Dick; that the appellant had nothing to do with the employment, discharge, or payment of
the men, who were engaged in digging
and excavating the trenches for laying the'water-pipes, or in the blasting
of rock, or in the manner of doing
the work, prior to the death of said
Dick; and that the said Farrington
had full and complete control, by
himself and his employ~s, over the
mode of digging and excavating the
trenches and blasting for the pipes,
and he employed, discharged, and
paid the men so engaged prior to and
at the time of the death of said Dick.
"It is claimed by the appellant's
counsel, as we understand their position and argument, that the facts thus
specially found by the jury are inconsistent with their general verdict,
within the meaning of the statutory
provision above quoted (viz., 'when
the special finding of the facts is inconsistent with the general verdict,
the former shall control the latter,
and the Court shall give judgment
accordingly'), in regard to such inconsistency, because they show that
the death of John Dick was caused
by the wrongful act or omission of
Thomas B. Farrington, or of the servants of said Farringten, who at the
time was exercising an independent
employment, under, and as the assignee of, a written contract with the
appellant, and between whom and
the appellant the relation of servant
and master did not at the time exist.
Ordinarily, in such a case, the law
seems to be well settled that one person is not liable for the acts or negligence of another person, unless the
relation of master and servant exists
between them; and that, where an
injury has been done by a party ex*ercising an independent employment,
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the person employing him will not be
liable in damages for injury or death
resulting from the wrongful act or
omissions of such party, or of the servants of such party. The general
rule of law, almost universally recognized in this country by the courts
of last resort, seems to be that where
the work contracted for was not a
nuisance per se, the employer of the
contractor for such work will not be
liable to a third person, or his representative, for an injury or death
which results from the wrongful act
or omission of such contractor, or of
his servants, agents, or sub-contractors in the performance of such work:
Hilliard v. .Richardson, 3 Gray, 349;
Linton v. Smith, 8 Id. 147; Brackett
v. Lubke, 4 Allen, 138; Barry v.
City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121 ; Blake
v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48; Pack v. The
3ayor, etc., 8 Id. 222; .Kelly v. The
3ayor, etc., 11 Id. 432; Storrs v. The
City of Utica, 17 Id. 104 ; ]1Cafferty
v. The Spuyten, etc., Railroad Co., 61
Id. 178; Painter v. The Mayor; etc.,
46 Pa. St. 213; Allen v. Willard, 57
Id. 374; Wray v. rans, 80 Id. 102;
DeForrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368;
The City of Detroit v. Corey, 9 Id.
165 ; Harper v. City of Milwaukee, 30
Wis. 365 1Scammon v. City of Chicago,
25 Ill. 424; City of Springfield v. L.
Claire, 49 Id. 476; Pfan v. Williamson, 63 Id. 16; City of Cincinnativ.
Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38; Clark v. Fry, 8
Id. 358; Chicago City v. Robbins, 2
Black. 418; Water Company v. Ware,
16 Wall. 566; Shearm. & Redf. on
-Neg.§ 79; Wharton on Neg. § 818.
This general rule of law was fully
recognized, approved, and acted upon
by this Court in the decision of the
recent case of Ryan v. Curran, 64 Ind.
345.
"It seems to us that, in view of the
exclusive power conferred, and of the
correlative duty necessarily imposed
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upon the appellant over the streets,
alleys, and highways within its corporate limits, in and by the legislation of this State, providing for the
incorporation of cities, the appellant
could not and ought not to be allowed
to avoid the imperative duty, which
it owed to the public, to keep its
streets, alleys, and highways in a
safe condition for the use in the usual
manner by travellers, nor to escape
responsibility for its neglect or failure
to perform such duty, upon the plea
that it had entered into a contract
with another person for the performance of the work, which rendered
such use of the street, alley, or highway unsafe or dangerous to the travelling public. It cannot be said, we
think, that the appellant's contract
with Farrington or his assignors, for
the construction and completion of its
waterworks, as found by the -jury,
could or did relieve the appellant of
its legal duty to keep those streets,
wherein the water-pipes were being
laid, in such safe condition for the use
in the usual manner as that its inhabitants and the general public might
safely and conveniently pass and repass over, along, and across such
streets. Notwithstanding such contract the appellant stood charged by
law with a duty, and could not relieve itself by that or any other contract of such duty, in the care and
control of its streets, in and through
which its waterworks were in process
of construction. If, in the progress
of the work, blasting was dangerous
and unnecessary, the appellant's duty
to its inhabitants and the public required that it should prevent such
blasting; and if, on the other hand,
the blasting was necessary, and,
though dangerous, the danger could
be averted by the use of proper precautions, the appellant's plain duty
was to require its contractor to use

such precautions.
The appellant
could not, by any contract it might
make, avoid its liability to third persons for injury or death resulting from
a breach of its duty in the care and
control of its streets: Grove v. The
City of Fort Wayne, 45 Ind. 429;
The Town of C(nterville v. Woods,
57 Id. 192; Mahanoy Township v.
Scholby, 84 Pa. St. 136." See, also,
The City of Logansport v. Dick, 70
Ind. 65 ; followed in Turner v. City of
Indianapolis, 96 Ind. 1 ; The City of
Fort Wayne v. Coombs et al., 107 Id.
75.
In _Pack v. City of New York, 8 N.
Y. 222, cited in the principal case, a
contractor, grading a streetwithin the
city of New York, carelessly discharged a blast in the street, and
thereby injured a house by a stone
falling upon it. The city was held
not liable on the ground that the relation of master and servant did not
exist between the city and the contractor.
In Kelly v. City of New Mork, 11 N.
Y. 432, the injury was to a horse,
caused by a blast in the street, and
the city was held not liable, relying
upon Pack v. New York, supra. (On
the second trial the plaintiff was nonsuited: 4 E. D. Smith, 291.)
In
these two cases, the case of Blake v.
Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48, was relied upon,
and also the case of Rapson v. Cubitt,
9 Mees. & Wels. 710. The case of
Blake v. Ferriswas where the plaintiff
fell into a sewer, being constructed in
the street. The action was against
the licensee of the city, but the sewer
was left in the condition in which it
was the cause of the accident by a
contractor of the licensee, and who
had absolute control of the work.
The licensee was held not liable; and
this was possibly a correct decision.
It appeared that the city retained
seine control over the work, for it was
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constructed under the inspection of
its street conunissioner, and the
licensee was under an obligation to the
city to protect the public by proper
guards and lights at night, and to
"be answerable for any damages or
injuries which might be occasioned to
persons, animals, or property in any
manner connected with the construction of the sewer." This decision was
afterwards doubted by CoMsTocK, J.,
in Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 106, not
because the opinion did not contain a
correct exposition of the doctrine of
respondeateuperir, but whether it was
applied with strict accuracy to the facts
of the case. "For," says he, "the
cause of the accident was not any unskilfulness in the performance of the
work, but the result of the work itself,
however skilfully performed."
In
Rapson v. Cubitt, relied upon in Pack
v. City of New York, Cubitt contracted
with the Clarence Club to make certain alterations in their club house,
and, amongst the rest, to prepare and
fit the necessary gas fittings ; he made
a contract with a gas fitter to execute
that part of the work, who performed
it. In the course of the work, through
the gas fitter's negligence, the gas expleded and injured the plaintiff, who
sued Cubitt to recover for the injury,
on the ground that the gas fitter was
his servant; but his right of action
was denied, on the ground that there
was no relation of master and servant.
In the principal case, McCaoferty v.
The Spuyten, etc., R. R. Co., 61 N. Y.
178, is cited and relied upon. In
that case, a railroad company hired a
contractor, who had the entire charge
of the work, employing and discharging all the men at work in construction of its entire road-bed, taking
from him a contract of indemnity of
all liability arising by reason of his or
his servants' negligence. The plaintiff was injured in his property by
Vor. XXXVI.-99

stones thrown on his land by a blast.
The railroad company was held not
liable, although there was a strong
dissenting opinion by Commissioner
Wright.
It will thus be seen that none of
the cases relied upon in the principal
case are strictly in point, for they do
not touch upon the duty of a municipal corporation to keep its streets in
order, and its impossibility to shift
that burden, by contract, on to another, and thus escape liability.
In Pack's case and in Kelly's case
above referred to, the injury was collateral: and not a necessary incident
of the work done. In Storrs v. City
of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104, this distinction is pushed forward very vigorously, and the assertion made that
these cases were rightly decided. In
the latter case, the city let out the
construction of a sewer to a contractor,
who omitted to use the proper guards;
and the plaintiff by reason of this
neglect fell into the sewer and was
injured. The city was held liable on
the ground that the injury resulted
from the very act the contract required him to do, and in such an
instance the maxim of respondeat
superiorapplies: Cooley on Torts (1st
ed.), 546. But in the opinion, there
is laid down a doctrine not strictly
calling for its enunciation, that a city
cannot avoid liability, in such a case,
by letting out the construction of a
sewer to an independent contractor.
"What then is the obligation of a
city corporation when it undertakes
to construct a sewer in a public street ?
Can it in that undertaking, and in
any mode of providing for the execution of the work, throw off the duty
in question and the responsibilities
through which that duty is to be enforced f Although the work may be
let out by contract, the corporation
still remains charged with the care
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and control of the street in which the
improvement is carried on. The performance of the work necessarily
renders the street unsafe for night
travel. This is a result which does
not at all depend on the care or negligence of the laborers employed by the
contractor. The danger arises from
the very nature of the improvement,
and if it can be averted only by
special precautions, such as placing
guards or lighting the street, the corporation which has authorized the
work is plainly bound to take those
precautions. The contractor may very
probably be bound by his agreement,
not only to construct the sewer but
also to do such other acts as are necessary to protect travel. But a municipal corporation cannot, I think, in
this way either avoid indictment in
behalf of the public or its liability to
individuals who are injured."
In McCafferty's case, it is said that
"the defendant was held liable because it owed a duty to the public to
keep its streets in a safe condition for
travel, and not because it was responsible for any negligent act of the
contractor ;" and a quotation is made
from TVater Company v. Ware, 16 Wall.
566, which was a case where the defendant had taken a contract to lay
water-pipes in the streets of St. Paul,
and then sublet the work, and the
sub-contractor, by carelessness in
running a steam engine in the street,
scared a horse, which ran away and
injured the plaintiff. The defendant
was held liable, on the ground of a
contract of indemnity existing between the contractor and the sub-contractor. See Creed v. Hartman, 29 N.
Y. 591, for a discussion of Storrs v.
Utica, supra. Storrs's case is referred
to as an authority in Brusso v. City of
Bufal, 90 N. Y. 679. There, the
plaintiff fell into an excavation made
in a street and was injured. "The

excavation was made under the direction of the water department of the
city by a contractor with that department. The plaintiff in attempting to
cross the street in the night time, fell
into the excavation and received the
injury. * * * * The city was under
an absolute duty to keep its streets in
a safe condition for public travel, and
was bound to exercise reasonable diligence and care to accomplish that end,
and when it'caused this excavation to
be made in the street, it was bound to
see that it was carefully guarded, so
as to be reasonably free from danger
to travellers upon the street. It is
not absolved from its duty and its responsibility because it employed a
contractor to make the excavation.
That is settled by a long line of decisions in this and other States:
Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104;
Chicago City v. Robbins, 2 Black. 418;
Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657;
Water Company v. Ware, 16 Id. 566;
City of St. Paul v. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297;
City of Logansportv. Dick, 70 Ind. 65;
Dillon on Municipal Corporations,
§§ 791, 792, 793."
Storrs's case was again cited and
commented upon in Vogel v. Mfayor,
etc., 92 N. Y. 10. In this last case a
contractor, after digging holes in a
street, in pursuance of his contract,
abandoned the work. Water accumulated in these holes after the time
for the performance of the work had
expired, and then injured an adjoining lot owner. The city was held
liable, because it permitted the defect
to remain after the work had been
abandoned. Blake's case, Pack's case,
and Kelly's case were held not to be
in point.
In City of Springfield v. L. Claire.
49 Ill. 476, it is said: "The construction of the sewer by contract did not
release the city from the obligation
while in process of construction, to
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have it so carried on as not to endanger the lives or limbs of travellers
upon the street. It could have required this of the contractors, and it
was negligence to omit it. * * * *
There is no charge in this declaration
of negligence in not keeping the street
in repair, but for permitting the work
to be carried on in a street, dangerous
in itself, without proper safeguards,
and which they neglected to supply."
See Blake v. St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569.
Still adhering to the early case in
the Court of Appeals of New York, it
was held by the Supreme Court of
that State, under the same conditions
as in Blumb v. City of Kansas, 84 Mo.
112, in the earlier stage of the case
under annotation that the city was
not liable: Herrington v. Village of
Lansingburgh, 36 Hun, 598. So, following Storrs v. City of Utica, a similar
decision was made in Dressell v. City
of Kingston, 32 Hun, 533. Exactly in
a line with the doctrine of Logansportv.
Dick, supra, is Nashville v. Brown, 9
Heisk. 1; Mayor, etc., v. O'Donnell,
53 Md. 110 (approving Storrs's case
and disapproving Barry's and Painter's cases) ; City of Joliet v. Seward,
86 Ill. 402; Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 323; Watson v. Tripp,
11 R. I. 98; see Savannah v. Waldner,
49 Ga. 316; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich.
165 ; Palmer v. City of Lincoln, 5 Neb.
136 (the last two cases follow the
doctrine of Storrs's case). See City
of Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38;
Lockwood v. New York, 2 Hilt. 66;
Cirdeville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465.
Where a railroad company was constructing its line in a street, the town
was held liable for an injury caused
by obstructions the company had
placed there: Willard v. Town of
Newbury, 22 Vt. 458; Batty v. Duzbury, 24 Id. 155 : so, one constructing
a sewer into which the plaintiff fell:
City of Buffalo v. Halloway, 3 Selden,
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493. We have not overlooked the
case of Painterv. City of Pittsburgh, 46
Pa. St. 213; s. c. 3 AsERICAN LAw
REGISTER, N. S. 350; and several
others following in its train or preceding it. That was a case where one
Painter fell into a sewer, being constructed by a contractor with the city,
and was killed. The action was
brought by his wife; and the city
held not liable. The decision is made
to turn solely upon the relation of
master and servant, or of the noncontrol of the city over the immediate
work. "The verdict determines that
the fault was all that of the contractors. Over them the defendants
had no more control than the plaintiff's husband had. They were not
in a subordinate relation to the defendants--neither servants nor agents.
They were in an independent employment, and sound policy demands that,
in such a case, the contractor alone
should be held liable." Nothing is
said of the duty of the city to the
public. This neglect was noticed by
Judge MITCHELL in a note appended to
the case in Tis REGISTER, p. 360.
The views of the Judge expressed in
that note, dissenting from the opinion,
hale met the approval of a number of
appellate Courts, and the case as a
sound authority rejected.
In City of Erie v. Caulkins, 85
Pa. St. 247, it was held that a city
was not liable to a person falling
into an excavation, carelessly left
open, for a sewer, being constructed
by a contractor with the city, even
though the latter reserved the power
to direct by its engineer changes in
the time and manner of conducting
the work, and the contractor was held
responsible to indemnify the city for
any damages it should be subjected
to in consequence of his neglect, he
executing a bond to the city for that
purpose. See Reed v. Allegheny, 80
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Penna. St. 300. Here again the principle of master and servant is invoked.
Where, however, a township let out
the contract of repairing its roads to a
contractor, it was held liable to one
receiving an injury by reason of the
non-repair of a road therein, distinguishing the case from Painter's case,
for the reason that "the accident did
not happen during the progress of the
work and whilst tbe contractor had
the road in his exclusive control, but
after it was turned over to the township as a finished job and in proper
repair." Mahanoy Township v. Scholby, 84 Pa. St. 136.
In Missouri, it is held that a city is
not liable for an injury to a passer in
a street, caused by the negligence of a
contractor in blasting: Blumb v. City
of Kansas, 84 Mo. 112. The early New
York cases are followed, and Logansport v. Dick, denied. This is a singular instance of the inability of a Court
to rise above precedent and decide a
case upon principle; for the reason
that it does not, upon examination,
find the case cited in support of
the decision condemned "upon all
fours" with the Indiana case, and,
therefore, immediately reaches the
conclusion that the Indiana case is decided without authority to support it.
See the somewhat singular decision of
Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121, but
reaching the same result. In this
same State, where a private corporation, for its own profit and gain, and
with the permission of the city, dug a
trench in the street, into which the
plaintiff fell and injured himself, the
city was held liable, because it allowed the streets to be used for a private enterprise: Russell v. Columbia,
74 Mo. 492. See IYnk v. St. Louis, 71
Id. 52.
In Pennsylvania, under like circumstances, the city was held not lia-

ble : Smithy. Simmons, 103 Pa. St. 32 ;
Borough of Susquehanna Depot v. Simmons, 112 Id. 384.
Where a statute made it the duty
of a supervisor, who was an independent officer, to work the roads of his
county, and keep them in repair, his
county, it was held, was not liable for
his neglect, whereby a traveller was
injured: County Commissioners of Anne
Arundel v. Durall, 54 Md. 350; so of
a superintendent : Barney v. City of
Lowell, 98 lass. 570; a surveyor:
Ball v. Town of Winchester, 32 N. It.
435; Wolcott v. Swampscott, 1 Allen,
101. Where the city, by statute, was
compelled to let the contract to the
lowest bidder, it was held, for that
reason, not liable: James v. San .Francisco, 6 Cal. 528.
The Supreme Court of the United
States have laid down the rule, that
wherethe obstruction or defectcaused
or created in the street is purely collateral to the work to be done, and is
entirely the result of the wrongful
acts of the contractor or his workmen,
the rule is that the employer is not
liable; but where the obstruction or
defect which occasioned the injury
results directly from the acts which
the contractor agrees and is authorized to do, the person who employs the contractor and authorizes
him to do those acts is equally liable
to the injured party: Robbins v. City
of Chicago, 4 Wall. 657 ; City of Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black. 418 ; s. c. 2
AMERICAN LAW REoISTER, 529. This
rule, and almost the language it is
couched in, has been adopted by
Judge DzLoN, as the better and later
rule: 2 Dill. Municip. Corp. § 1030.
It is necessarily limited or modified by
another rule, that if a man employ
another to do a piece of work, intrinsically dangerous, however skilfully
performed, he is regarded as the au-
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thor of the mischief resulting from it:
Id. § 1020. See Savannahv. Waldner,
49 Ga. 316; Wright v. Holbrook, 52 N.
H. 120.
Is not blasting in. a public street intrinsically dangerous I Does not a
liability for an injury caused thereby
fall within the rule holding one liable
who has authorized the performance
of work intrinsically dangerous ? If
a corporation contracts for the construction of sewers in its streets, it
authorizes the usage of all means necessaryto construct them; andifrock
requiring blasting is met with, it impliedly authorizes the use of the blast.
As a test of this question, does any
one suppose the city, after it had let
the contract, could enjoin the use of
necessary blasting? Not unless it

had provided, in the contract, against
its use. If the city, before letting the
contract, did not know that blasting
would be necessary, it ought to have
known it, and cannot plead ignorance
where ignorance amounts to negligence.
But without insisting upon this
view of the question, it seems that the
ground of liability is amply sustained
by the proposition anounced in Logansport v. Dick, that a city owes a
duty to the public to keep its streets
in a safe condition for public travel,
which cannot be contracted away, nor
devolved upon another, so as to evade
pecuniary liability.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

United States Circuit Court, District of New Jersey.
STOCKTON, ATTY.-GEN. OF NEW JERSEY, v. BALTIMORE & N. Y.
R. R. CO.
There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent Congress from enabling
State corporations to carry out the powers of Congress, without interference by
the States.
The power of Congress "to regulate commerce," is supreme over the whole
subject, and is unembarrassed and unimpeded by State lines or State laws.
The powers of the United States are to be found only in the Constitution of
the United States, and are not conferred by the consent of the States, from
time to time, however much such consent may facilitate the execution of those
powers.
Congress may authorize the erection of a bridge, which is a part of the
means of inter-state communication though a State may have forbidden such
erection.
The United States may acquire the use of land lying in or belonging to a
State without a cession of jurisdiction by the State, and without the consent
of the State. In such case, there is concurrent jurisdiction in the National
and State Courts.
The shore and land under the water of navigable streams and waters are
held by the States, in trust, for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and
the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons, and other facilities of navigation and commerce.
Uses of navigation and commerce are paramount to those of public fishery.
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Commerce, not navigation, is the great object of constitutional care.
No compensation need be provided for the use of the lands of a State, between high and low water-mark, for the piers of a bridge, which has been
authorized by Congress as an instrument of inter-state commerce.
INFORMATION filed in the Court of Chancery of New Jersey,
to restrain the erection of the piers of a bridge upon lands
belonging to the State, and lying between high and low water-mark of a navigable stream; cause removed to the United
States Circuit Court of the District, by the defendants, who
were citizens of another State.
John P. Stockton, atty.-gen., Barker Gummere and Cortlandt
Parker,for informant.
A. Q. Keasbey and W. W. Macfarland,for defendants.
BRADLEY, J.
This case was commenced by information
filed by the attorney-general of New Jersey, in the Court of
Chancery of that State, praying for an injunction to restrain
the defendants from erecting a bridge across Arthur-kill,
between New Jersey and Staten Island, in the State of New
York, upon the lands of the State situate on the shore, and
under the waters of said kill. The chancellor granted a preliminary injunction upon the bill and affidavits. The defend-

ants have removed the case to this Court, as one arising

under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
have filed an answer.

Motion was then made to dissolve the

injunction, but, after argument, the parties stipulated to submit the case as.upon final hearing, on bill and answer. There
are no controverted facts in the case.
The Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company, a

corporation of New York, one of the defendants, claims the
right to build the bridge in question, and to occupy the land
under water necessary for the support of its piers, under an
Act of Congress, approved June 16, 1886, entitled "An Act
to authorize the construction of a bridge across the Staten
Island Sound, known as 'Arthur-kill,' and to establish the
same as a post-road." This Act declares:"Section 1. That it shall be lawful for the Staten Island Rapid Transit
Company, a corporation existing under the laws of the State of New York, and
the Baltimore & New York Railroad Company, a corporation existing under
the laws of the State of New Jersey, or either of said companies, to build and
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maintain a bridge across the Staten Island Sound, or Arthur-kill, from New
Jersey to Richmond County, New York, for the passage of railroad trains, engines, and cars thereon, and to lay on and over said bridge, railway tracks for
the more perfect connection of any railroads that are or shall be constructed
to the said sound at or opposite said point; and in case of any litigation concerning any alleged obstruction to the free navigation of said sound, on
account of said bridge, the cause may be tried before the Circuit Court of the
United States of either of said States in which any portion of said obstruction or
bridge touches, and that all railway companies desiring to use the said bridge
shall have and be entitled to equal rights and privileges in the passage over
the same, and in the use of the machinery and fixtures thereof, and of all the
approaches thereto, for a reasonable compensation, to be paid to the owners of
said bridge under and upon such terms and conditions as shall be prescribed
by the Secretary of War, upon hearing the allegations and proofs of the
parties, in case they shall not agree.
" Sec. 2. That said bridge shall be constructed as a pivot drawbridge, with
a draw over the main channel of the sound at an accessible and navigable
point, and with spans of not less than two hundred feet in length in the clear,
on each side of the central or pivot pier of the draw ; and said spans shall not
be less than thirty-two feet above mean low water-mark, measuring to the
lowest member of the bridge superstructure ; and provided, also, that said
draw shall be opened promptly, upon signal, except when trains are passing
over the said bridge, for the passage of boats whose construction shall not be
such as to admit of their passage under the draw of the said bridge when
closed; but in no case shall unnecessary delay occur in opening the said draw
after the passage of trains; and the said company or corporation shall maintain, at its own expense, from sunset to sunrise, such lights or other signals
on said bridge as the light-house board shall prescribe.
" Sec. 3. That any bridge constructed under this Act, and according to its
limitations, shall be a lawful structure, and shall be recognized and known as
a post-route, upon which, also, no higher charge shall be made for the transmission over the same of the mails, the troops, and the munitions of war of the
United States, than the rate per mile paid for their transportation over the
railroads or public highways leading to said bridge; and the United States
shall have the right of way for postal telegraph purposes, across said bridge.
"1See. 4. That the plan and location of said bridge, with a detailed map of
the sound at the proposed site of the bridge, and near thereto, exhibiting the
depths and currents, shall be submitted to the Secretary of War for his approval, and, until he approves the plan and location of said bridge, it shall
not be built; but, upon the approval of said plan by the Secretary of War, the
said companies, or either of them, may proceed to the erection of said bridge
in conformity with said approved plan; and should any change be made in
the plan of said bridge during the progress of the work thereon, such change
shall be subject likewise to the approval of the Secretary of War. If the Secretary of War shall at any time deem any change or alteration necessary in the
said bridge, so that the same shall not obstruct navigation, or if he shall think
the removal of the whole structure necessary, the alteration so required, or the
removal of the whole structure, shall be made at the expense of the parties
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owning said bridge. And if said bridge shall not be finished within two years
from the passage of this Act, the rights and privileges hereby granted shall
determine and cease.
"Sec. 5. That the right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is hereby expressly reserved."

The said Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company
proposes to build a bridge across Arthur-kill, under and in
conformity with this Act, to connect its own road on Staten
Island with another railroad through and across the State of
New Jersey, for the purpose of inter-state transportation;
and, in pursuance of that design, has adopted a site for the
location of the bridge, from a certain point in the city of
Elizabeth to Staten Island; and has caused the plan and location of said bridge, with a detailed map of the sound at End
near the same (as required by the Act), to be submitted to the
Secretary of War, who has approved the same.
The company, by its engineer and contractors (who are
made co-defendants in the case), proceeded to make preparations for laying the piers and erecting the bridge, according
to the plan thus approved. Thereupon the attorney-general of
New Jersey, deeming the property rights and sovereignty of
the State in danger of violation from the erection of the proposed bridge, filed the present information to prevent it.
The information states the ordinary doctrine that the State
is owner of the shore and land under water of all navigable
streams and arms of the sea within its borders; that this
ownership was a part of the jura regalia of the king of Great
Britain, by virtue.of which he was seised and possessed of an
estate in fee-simple absolute in said lands; and that, at the
Revolution, this State, in its sovereign capacity, succeeded to
the rights of the crown, and that this right of supreme dominion had never been ceded or surrendered to the United
States; and that, without such cession or surrender, the
United States could not take possession of said lands, or
authorize other parties to do so, except by making conipensation therefor, as provided in the fifth Amendment to the Constitution; and that, at the place of location of the proposed
bridge; their ownership of the soil, on the part of the State,
extended from ordinary high water-mark to the centre line
of the sound, being the boundary line between New Jersey
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and New York, as settled by agreement in 1833, and confirmed by Act of Congress, June 28, 1834.
The information further states that this ownership on the
part of the State has been practically exercised by it for more
than a century past, by regulating the enjoyment and disposition of the lands under the navigable waters within its
limits, passing laws for the preservation and protection of the
oyster fisheries therein, and authorizing the construction of
wharves, with solid filling, to certain prescribed limits beyond low water-mark, and that for these privileges the
grantees are required to pay, and have paid a certain compensation to the State. It is contended by the informant that
the Act of Congress cannot be construed as intending to give
any authority to take any portion of said lands without compensation ; that said Act must be construed as a mere license
or permission to erect the proposed bridge, so far as Congress,
the conservator of navigation, is concerned, leaving the companies to obtain from the State the usual authority to build
the bridge on the territory and lands of the State; but that
if the Act should be construed as giving authority to erect
the bridge without the consent of the State, and without compensation for taking its lands therefor, then it is a violative
of the Constitution of the United States, not only for authorizing the lands of the State to be taken without compensation, but for enlarging the powers of a corporation created by
the State itself (if the bridge should be built by the Baltimore
and New York Railroad Company), and authorizing it to do
what, by its own charter and other laws of the State, it is
prohibited from doing.
The information further contends that the other corporation defendant, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Company, is
not a corporation of New Jersey, and has no authority from
the State to exercise any corporate franchises therein, and
cannot lawfully do so, except by the comity of the State,
which Las not been accorded to it; that, instead of any such
comi ty having been exercised, the said company is expressly prohibited fromexercisinganysuchpowers or franchises as that of
building said bridge by an Act of the Legislature of New
Jersey, passed April 6, 1886, which prohibits any person or
VOL. XXXVI.-100
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corporation from erecting any bridge, viaduct, or fixed structure over or in any part of the navigable waters where the
tide ebbs and flows, and separating said State from other
States, without permission of the Legislature of New Jersey
first given by statute for that purpose, and that no such permission has ever been asked or given.
The answer of the defendants does not advance any material
new facts, except to state that the Baltimore and New York
Railroad Company has nothing to do with the proposed
building of the bridge, and that the Staten Island Rapid
Transit Railroad Company proposes to build it as a connecting link in a line of railroad extending from the Bay of New
York across the soil of the States of New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and other States as an instrument of commerce
among the States, and claims the right to do so under the Act
of Congress before recited.
The first question to be examined is the true construction
of the Act of Congress on which the case arises-the informant contending that it is merely permissory in its character ;
and the defendants, that it gives authority and power to build
a bridge, without reference to any authority from the State.
This question need not detain us long. The words of the
Act are broad enough to confer the authority, if Congress has
power to confer it. The language is: "It shall be lawful for
the Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company," etc.," to
build and maintain a bridge across the Staten Island Sound, or
Arthur-kill. "This is the ordinary language used for conferring authority. Had the State Legislature passed a law in
these terms, there could not be a doubt of its sufficiency to
give authority. And there are expressions in the Act which
imply that plenary authority was intended to be given. The
minute directions laid down as to the manner of construction,
and use of the bridge imply this. The third section declares
"that any bridge constructed under this Act, and according to
it-; limitations, shall be a lawful structure," etc. ; implying
tl.at the construction of the bridge, when built, would be
uler the Act. If Congress had no power to authorize the
construction of the bridge, independent of State legislation,
the Act would, of course, be properly construed aspermissory
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in its character, ancillary to, or confirmatory of, State legislation which might be adopted for the purpose of authorizing
such a bridge. In other words, the Act, within the scope of
its terms, may have such effect given to it as comports with
the power of the legislative body which enacted it; just as a
deed of conveyance may operate as a grant, a bargain and sale,
a release, or a confirmation, according to the interest of the
grantor on the one hand, and of the grantee on the other.
The true construction of the Act, therefore, depends on the
power of Congress, which will be examined hereafter.
Another question of a preliminary character relates to the
capacity and right of the defendant, the Staten Island Rapid
Transit Railroad Company, to perform any acts and transact
any business as a corporation in New Jersey. It is argued
that corporations, as such, have no legal existence outside of
the State by whose laws they are created, and cannot transact
business in another State except by the comity of its laws,
which are not accorded in the present case. This doctrine is
subject to much qualification. The habits of business have so
changed since the decision in the case of Bank of Augusta v.
ERarle, 13 Pet. 519, and corporate organizations have been
found so convenient, especially as avoiding a dissolution at
every change of membership, that a large part of thebusiness
of the country has come to be transacted by their instrumentality ; while their most objectionable feature, the non-liability of corporators, has in most instances been abrogated in
whole or in part; and to deny their admission from one State
to another in ordinary cases, at the present day, would go far
to neutralize that provision in the fourth Article of the Constitution which secures to the citizens of one State all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in another, and that provision of the fourteenth Amendment which secures to allpersons the equal protection of the laws. So strongly is this felt
that, in the recent caseofSanta Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. 1R. R.
Co., 118 U. S. 394,396, the doctrine that corporations are not
citizens or persons, within the protective language of the
Constitution, was unanimously disapproved, and the Court expressly held that they are entitled, as well as individuals to
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the equal protection of the laws, under the fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
It is undoubtedly just and proper that foreign corporations
should be subject to the police regulations of the State, and
should have, if required, an agent in the State to accept service of process when sued for acts done or contracts made
therein. In reference to some branches of business, like those
of banking and insurance, which affect the people at large,
they may also be subject to more stringent regulations for the
security of the public, and may be even prohibited from pursuing them except upon such terms and conditions, not unlawful in themselves, as the State chooses to impose. But in the
pursuit of business authorized by the government of the
United States, and under its protection, the corporations of
other States cannot be prohibited or obstructed by any State.
If Congress should employ a corporation of ship-builders
to construct a man-of-war, they would have the right
to purchase the necessary timber and iron in any State of the
Union. And, in carrying on foreign and inter-state commerce,
corporations, equally with individuals, are within the protection of the commercial power of Congress, and cannot be
molested in another State, by State burdens or impediments.
This was held and decided in the case of GloucesterF"erry Co.
v. Pennsylvania,114 U. S.204, and affirmed in the recent case
of -PhiladelphiaS. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S.326; and
although the decision in Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168,
conformed to the doctrine of Augusta Bank v. Earle, the following striking language was used by the Court, to wit:
"At the time of the formation of the Constitution, a large part of the commerce of the world was carried on by corporations. The East India Company,
the Hudson's Bay Company, the Hamburgh Company, the Levant Company,
and the Virginia Company, may be named among the many corporations then
in existence, which acquired, from the extent of their operations, celebrity
throughout the commercial world. This state of facts forbids the supposition
that it was intended, in the grant of power to Congress, to exclude from ita
control the commerce of corporations. The language of the grant makes no
reference to the instrumentality by which commerce may be carried on; it is
general, and includes alike commerce by individuals, partnerships, associations, aid corporations."

We may fairly supplement this language by adding, that,
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when the Constitution was adopted, it could not have been
supposed that the regulations of commerce to be made by
Congress, might be of no avail to commercial corporations,
or, at least, might be rendered nugatory with regard to them,
in consequence of State restrictions upon their power to act
as corporations in any other State than that of their origin.
At all events, if Congress, in the execution of its powers,
chooses to employ the intervention of a proper corporation,
whether of the State, or out of the State, we see no reason
why it should not do so. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent it from making contracts with or conferring
powers upon State corporations for carrying out its own
legitimate purposes. What right of the State would be invaded? The corporation thus employed, or empowered, in
executing the will of Congress, could do nothing which the
State could rightfully oppose or object to. It may be added
that no State corporation more suitable than the defendant
could be empowered to build the bridge in question in this
case, since one-half of the bridge is in the State of New York,
and the railroad of the defendant is to connect with it on the
New York side.
In our judgment, if Congress itself has the power to construct a bridge across a navigable stream for the furtherance
of commerce among the States, it may authorize the same to
be done by agents, whether individuals or a corporation
created by itself, or a State corporation already existing and
concerned in the enterprise. The objection that Congress
cannot confer powers on a State corporation is untenable. It
has used their agency for carrying on its own purposes from
an early period. It adopted as post-roads the turnpikes belonging to the various turnpike corporations of the country,
as far back as such corporations were known, and subjected
them to burdens, and accorded to them privileges, arising out
of that relation. It continued the same system with regard
to canals and railroads, when these modes of transportation
came into existence. Nearly half a century ago it constituted
every railroad built, or to be built, in the United States, a
post-road. This, of course, involved duties, and conferred
privileges and powers, not contained in their original charter.
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In 1866 Congress authorized every steam railroad company
in the United States to carry passengers and goods on their
way from one State to another, and to receive compensation
therefor, and to connect with roads of other States, so as to
form continuous lines for the transportation of the same to
the place of destination. The powers thus conferred were
independent of the powers conferred by the charter of any
railroad company. Surely these acts of Congress cannot be
condemned as unconstitutional exertions of power.
In the present case, the corporate capacity of the Staten
Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company is admitted, by
making it a defendant. It is not excluded from the State by
any want of comity in the laws of the State. Its alleged
want of power under those laws to build the bridge in question, does not arise from any thing peculiar to it as a foreign
corporation, but from the general prohibition of the State
law of April 6, 1886, which is applicable to all persons and
corporations, and declares "that no bridge, viaduct, or fixed
structure shall be created by any person or corporation, over
or in any part of the navigable waters separating this State from
other States, where the tide ebbs and flows, without express
permission of the Legislature of this State, given by statutes
for that purpose." This prohibition, in its broadest sense,
inhibits the erection of such a bridge as is described therein,
by Congress itself, or (which is the same thing) by any person
or corporation acting under the authority of Congress, and,
of course, is to that extent void, if Congress has power to
erect such a bridge. But if it is not to be taken in this broad
sense, but as subject to the condition in law, of being inoperative as against the paramount power of Congress, then the
authority of the defendant is unaffected by it, inasmuch as
the defendant has express powet from Congress to build the
bridge. •So that we are brought back to the question of the
power of- Congress to build the bridge, and whether that
power is independent of the consent and concurrence of the
State government; and, in our judgment, this question must
be answered in the affirmative.
The power to regulate commerce among the several States
is given by the Constitution in the most general and absolute
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terms. The "power to regulate," as applied to a government,
has a most extensive application.

With regard to commerce,

it has been expressly held that it is not confined to commercial transactions, but extends to seamen, ships, navigation,
and the appliances and facilities of commerce. And it must
extend to these, or it cannot embrace the whole subject.
Under this power the navigation of rivers and harbors has
been opened and improved, and we have no doubt that canals
and water-ways may be opened to connect navigable bays,
harbors, and rivers with each other, or with the interior of
the country. Nor have we any doubt that, under the same
power, the means of commercial communication by land, as
well as by water, may be opened up by Congress between
different States, whenever it shall see fit to do so, either on
failure of the States to provide such communication, or whenever, in the opinion of Congress, increased facilities of communication ought to exist. Hitherto, it is true, the means
of commercial communication have been supplied, either by
nature in the navigable waters of the country, or by the
States in the construction of roads, canals, and railroads, so
that the functions of Congress have not been largely called
into exercise under this branch of its jurisdiction and power,
except in the improvement of rivers and harbors, and the
licensing of bridges across navigable streams. But this is no
proof that its power does not extend to the whole subject in
all its possible requirements. Indeed, it has been put forth
in several notable instances, which stand as strong arguments
of practical construction given to the Constitution by the
legislative department of the government. The Cumberland
or National Road is one instance of a grand thoroughfare
projected by Congress, extending from the Potomac to the
Mississippi. After being nearly completed it was surrendered
to the several States within which it was situate. The system of Pacific railroads presents several instances of railroads
constructed through or into several States, as Iowa, Kansas,
and California. The main stem of the Union Pacific commences at Council Bluffs, in Iowa, and crosses the Missouri
by a bridge at that place, erected under the authority of Congress alone. In 1862 a bridge was authorized by Congress
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to be constructed across the Ohio River at Steubenville, between the States of Virginia and Ohio, to be completed,
maintained, and operated by the railroad company authorized
to build it, and by another company named, "any thing in
any law or laws of the above-named States to the contrary
notwithstanding." 12 stat. 569.
Still, it is contended that, although Congress may have
power to construct roads and other means of communication
between the States, yet this can only be done with the concurrence and consent of the States in which the structures are
made. If this is so, then the power of regulation in Congress
is not supreme; it depends on the will of the States. We do
not concur in this view. We think that the power of Congress is supreme over the whole subject, unimpeded and unembarrassed by State lines or State laws; that, in this matter,
the country is one, and the work to be accomplished is
national; and that State interests, State jealousies, and State
prejudices do not require to be consulted. In matters of
foreign and inter-state commerce there are no States.
It is very true, that in some cases of bridges authorized to
be erected, and other things authorized to be done, Congress
may have required that the consent of the State should be
first obtained. But the power of the United States cannot
depend on the consent of the States ; it is only to be found
in the Constitution. The consent of a State may sometimes
facilitate the execution of a power, as the consent to the use
of the prisons, court-houses, and other public buildings of the
State; but it can never confer power. Particular States have
sometimes consented to the employment of their Courts and
judicial machinery by the officers of the United States for
condemning land for public purposes. But, if the United
States had no power to take land by condemnation, such consent would not give it. So where, in any case, Congress may
have authorized the construction of a railroad or a bridge
upon the condition of obtaining the consent of the State, it is
clear that such consent was not required for the purpose of
supplementing the power of Congress to authorize the structure to be made, but rather for the purpose of manifesting a
disposition of comity and good-will towards the State. For,
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if Congress had not the power, to authorize the structure,
consent could not give it. All those cases, therefore, in which
Congress has given such authority, N-hether with or without
the consent of the State, are precedents for affirming the
power of Congress. They are all instances of practical construction of the Constitution in favor of it.
The most strenuous objection, however, to the exercise of
the power in this case, .and in the manner proposed, is based
on the fact that the piers of the bridge are to rest, and the
bridge is to stand, on land which belongs to the State,
and that no compensation is proposed to be made for the
taking thereof. It is contended that if the land of the State
can be taken at all (which is denied), it can, at most, only be
taken, like other private property, after just compensation
has been made.
First,it is denied that the land of the State can be taken
at all without voluntary cession, or consent of the State Legislature. If this be so, we are brought back to the dilemma
of requiring the consent of the State in almost every case of
an inter-state line of communication by railroad, for hardly a
case can arise in which some property belonging to a State
will not be crossed. It will always be so at the passage of a
navigable stream. This shows that the position cannot be
sound, for it brings us to a reductio ad absurd-um. It interposes an effectual barrier to the execution of a constitutional
power vested in Congress. It overlooks the fundamental
principle that the Constitution, and all laws made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land; for, if the consent of a State is necessary, such State may always, in pursuit
of its own interests, refuse its c6nsent, and thus thwart the
plain objects and purposes of the Constitution. One argument for the position is that no part of the territory of one
sovereign can be acquired by another except by conquest or
cession ; and therefore, in a case like the present, where conquest is out of the question, it can only be acquired by cession;
and this conclusion is supposed to be affirmed and provided
for, in our federal system, by the seventeenth paragraph of
section 8, Art. I. Const., which gives to Congress power to
exercise exclusive legislation "over all places purchased by
VOL. XXXVI.-i01
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the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same
shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings." It is argued that this
is the only constitutional method by which the United States
government can obtain the possession of lands within a State,
especially of lands belonging to the State.
The argument, however, is directed to the acquisition of
territory, with exclusive jurisdiction over the same, and is
entirely sound in that Tegard. But it does not touch the
question as to the power of the United States to acquire the
mere use of land without exclusive jurisdiction therein.
Nqearly all the powers of government are exercised over territories in which the United and the several States have concurrent jurisdiction. It is only in exceptional cases that the
United States desires to have exclusive jurisdiction, and a
consequent cession of territory. It is very true that the consent of the State Legislature is required in order to give the
United States this exclusive jurisdiction. But that is all. It
is not required when exclusive jurisdiction is not sought. On
the contrary, the government, if it sees fit, may condemn
land for its purposes without the consent of the State. Thus
it was decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Kohl v.
U. S., 91 U. S.367, that the government of the United States
may exercise the right of eminent domain within a State, for
the purpose of condemning land for the use of a post-office
building, and may, for this purpose, resort to its own courts.
In such a case,'there cannot be a doubt that the post-office
building could be erected and used by the government without asking the consent of the State Legislature. Such consent would, indeed, be necessary to vest in the United States
exclusive jurisdiction over the post-office building and
grounds; but it would not be necessary to enable the government to use the property for the purposes for which it was
acquired. And so of any other property wanted for a public
purpose; the consent of the Legislature is not necessary to
its acquisition, or to its use; but only to the exclusion of
State jurisdiction over the place. That jurisdiction, if allowed to remain, will extend to the punishment of crimes
committed against State laws therein, and to the service of
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State process, but, of course, cannot interfere with the execution of the United States laws, nor with the performance, by
United States officers and agents, of the duties devolved upon
them.
In short, cession by a State is only necessary to extinguish
its jurisdiction, in whole or in part, and is not necessary to
the use of land by the United States for public purposessubject, like all lands within the limits of the Union, to the
concurrent jurisdiction of both governments; that of the
United States being supreme. The laws of the latter are supreme everywhere, in the States as well as in the territories
of the United States; but have exclusive force, within the
States, only in such places as have been ceded by them.
The argument based upon the doctrine that the States
have the eminent domain or highest dominion in the lands
comprised within their limits, and that the United States
have no dominion in such lands, cannot avail to frustrate the
supremacy given by the Constitution to the government of
the United States in all matters within the scope of its sovereignty. This is not a matter of words, but of things. If it
is necessary that the United States government should have
an eminent domain still higher than that of the State, in
order that it may fully carry out the objects and purposes of
the Constitution, then it has it. Whatever may be the necessities or conclusions of theoretical law as to eminent domain
or anything else, it must be received as a postulate of the Constitution that the government of the United States is invested
with full and complete power to execute and carry out its
purposes. And as one of these purposes is the regulation of
commerce among the several States, and as that involves the
needs and ways of inter-communication, it follows that Congress may provide for these necessities, whether the States
co-operate and concur therein, or not.
But, secondly, it is contended that if the United States can
constitutionally take the land of the State, as well as that of
the citizen, for public purposes, without consent, it can only
do so in the same manner, and subject to the same condition,
namely, that of making just compensation. It is urged that
the language of the fifth Amendment of the Constitution is
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applicable to the case, and is imperative. This language is,
"Nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." It is insisted that the property of the
State in lands under its navigable waters is private property,
and comes strictly within the constitutional provision. It is
significantly asked, Can the United States take the State-house
at Trenton, and the surrounding grounds belonging to the
State, and: appropriate them to the purposes of a railroad
depot, or to any other use of the general government, without compensation? We do not apprehend that the decision
of the present case involves or requires a serious answer to
this question. The cases are clearly not parallpl. The character of the title or ownership by which the State holds the
State-house is quite different from that by which it holds the
land under the navigable waters in and around its territory.
The information rightly states that, prior to the Revolution,
the shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and
waters of the province of New Jersey belonged to the king
of Great Britain as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and
devolved to the State by right of conquest.
The information does not state, however, what is equally
true, that, after the conquest, the said lands were held by the
State, as they were by the king, in trust for the public uses
of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves,
piers, light-houses, beacons, and other facilities of navigation
and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were publiei
juris; in other words, they were held for the use of the people
at large. It is true that to utilize the fisheries, especially
those of shellfish, it was necessary to parcel them out to particular operators, and employ the rent or consideration for the
benefit of the whole people; but this did not alter the character of the title. The land remained subject to all other
public uses as before, especially to those of navigation and
commerce, which are always paramount to those of public
fisheries. It is also true that portions of the submerged
shoals -and fiats, which really interfered with navigation, and
could 'better subserve the purposes of commerce by being
filled up and reclaimed, were disposed of to individuals for
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that purpose. But neither did these dispositions of useless
parts affect the character of the title to the remainder.
Such being the character of the State's ownership of the
land under water-an ownership held, not for the purpose of
emolument, but for public use, especially the public use of
navigation and commerce-the question arises whether it is
a kind of property susceptible of pecuniary compensation,
within the meaning of the Constitution. The fifth Amendment provides only that private property shall not be taken
without compensation; making no reference to public property. But if the phrase may have an application broad
enough to include all property and ownership, the question
would still arise whether the appropriation of a few square
feet of the river bottom to the foundation of a bridge which
is to be used for the transportation of an extensive commerce
in aid and relief of that afforded by the water-way, is at
all a diversion of the property from its original public use.
It is not so considered when sea-walls, piers, wing-dams, and
other structures are erected for the purpose of aiding commerce by improving and preserving the navigation. Why
should it be deemed such when (without injury to the navigation) erections are made for the purpose of aiding and
enlarging commerce beyond the capacity of the navigable
stream itself, and of all the navigable waters of the country?
It is commerce, and not navigation, which is the great object
of constitutional care.
The power to regulate commerce is the basis of the power
to regulate navigation, and navigable waters and streams, and
these are so completely subject to the control of Congress, as
subsidiary to commerce, that it has become usual to call the
entire navigable waters of the country the navigable waters
of the United States. It matters little whether the United
States had or has not the theoretical ownership and dominion
in the waters, or the land under them; it has, what is more,
the regulation and control of them for the purposes of commerce. So wide and extensive is the operation of this power
that no State can place any obstruction in or upon any navigable waters against the will of Congress, and Congress may
summarily remove such obstructions at its pleasure. And all
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this power is derived from the power "to regulate commerce."
Is this power stayed when it comes to the question of erecting
a bridge for the purposes of commerce across a navigable
stream? We think not. We think that the power to regulate commerce between the States extends, not only to the
control of the navigable waters of the country, and the lands
under them, for the purposes of navigation, but for the purpose of erecting piers, bridges, and all other instrumentalities
of commerce which, in the judgment of Congress, may be
necessary or expedient.
Entertaining these views with regard to the power of Congress over the whole subject of the regulation of commerce
among the several States, including that of the navigable
waters of the country., and the lands under the same, as subsidiary to that end, we have no hesitation in declaring our
opinion to be that the authority given by the Act of June
16, 1886, to build the bridge in question, and, for that purpose, to erect the necessary piers of such bridge upon the
lands under water of Arthur-kill, is valid and constitutional,
and does not injuriously affect any property or other rights
of the State of New Jersey. This conclusion resolves also the
other questions remaining unanswered, with regard to the
true construction of the Act, and the capacity of the defendant, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company, to
perform the acts necessary to execute the authority given by
Congress.
The information is dismissed, with costs, and the injunction heretofore granted is dissolved.
I. The English doctrine of the private ownership of the crown, below
high water-mark, is very ancient, and
was, no doubt, brought to this country
by the early English settlers: State v.
Sargent, 45 Conn. 358, 371 (1877).
A doctrine which made the privilege
of erecting wharves and docks a crown
monopoly, was hardly suited to the
condition of a new country, whose inhabitants were poor and whose commerce was in its infancy. Accordingly, we find that the strictness of

the common law rule was early relaxed, in the older English settlements, in favor of the' interests of
navigation; and to-day, in nearly all
States bordering upon or including
tide waters, the right to erect docks
and wharves below the high watermark, is provided for by statutory
enactment or conceded by custom.
Probably the oldest statute on the
subject is the Ordinance of 1647, sometimes known as the Ordinance of 1641,
framed by the Colony of Massachusetts
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This well-known enactment
gave to the riparian owners upon tide
waters title to the tidal flats in front
of his land to low water-mark, or to
a line 100 rods from high water-mark,
if the low water-mark was further out
than that distance, expressly subject,
however, to the public rights of navigation and fishing. See this ordinance
quoted in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7
Cush. (Mass.) 53, 67 (1851). The Ordinance of 1647 was enacted for the
colony of Massachusetts only, but it
was extended by the courts to every
part of the province of Massachusetts
after the union of the colony of Massachusetts Bay with Plymouth and
Maine, and also with Nantucket and
Martha's Vineyard: Darker v. Bates,
13 Pick. (Mass.) 255 (1832); Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53
(1851).
The ordinance is held to
have given the riparian owner actual
ownership of the adjacent flats, and
not merely an incorporeal right to
wharf out over them: Commonwealth v.
Alger, supra. The riparian owner may
build a wharf on his flats or otherwise
inclose them, but until he does so, the
public has a right to pass over them
in boats and vessels, when covered by
water: Austin v. Carter, 1 Mass. 231
(1804); Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cush.
(Blass.) 347 (1851).
The riparian
owner may drive stakes in his fiats
for the express purpose of preventing
fishing upon them: Locke v. M1otley,
2 Gray, 265 (1854). But he must
not, by structures erected upon his
fiats, interfere with public rights of
navigation: Deering v. Long Warf,
25 Me. 51 (1845) ; Gerrish v. Proprietorsof Union Wharf, 26 Id. 384 (1847).
The legislature has power to define
and fix the public right of navigation
by establishing wharf lines, beyond
which owners of fiats could not extend their wharves or docks: Commonwealth v. Alger, supra. The Ordi-

nance of 1647 was passed in favor of
navigation. Speaking of the ordinance, PAnsos, C. J., says in the
case of Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mlass. 435
(1810), "when our ancestors emigrated to this country, their first settlements were on harbors or arms of
the sea; and commerce was among
the earliest objects of their attention. For the purposes of commerce,
wharves erected below high watermark were necessary. But the colony
was not able to build them at the
public expense. To induce persons
to erect them, the common law of England was altered by an ordinance
providing that the proprietor of land
adjoining the sea or salt water shall
hold to low water-mark, where the
tide does not ebb more than 100 rods,
but not more where the tide ebbs to a
greater distance" (page 438), the
ordinance being in favor of navigation, low water-mark is construed to
mean, not the low water-mark of ordinary tides, but the low water-mark
of the lowest tides: Sparhawk v. Bullard, 1 Mete. 95 (1840); Wonson v.
Wonson, 14 Allen, 71, 82 (1867);
Attorney-General v. Boston Wharf Co.,
12 Gray, 558 (1859). In Maine, however, it Is construed to mean ordinary
low water-natk : Gerrish v. Proprietors
of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384, (1847).
The Commonwealth has title to fiats
or submerged lands below low watermark, or more than 100 rods from
high water-mark: Boston v. Roxbury
Mill Co., 12 Pick. 467, 476 (1832).
The ordinance of 1647 extended by
the courts to Maine, after it became
part of the province of lassachusetts,
has never been abrogated, and remains
in full force in that State : Emerson v.
Taylor, 9 Greenl. 42 (1832) ; Duncan v.
Sylvester, 24 Me. 482 (1844) ; Gerrish
v. Proprietorsof Union Whaf, 26 Id.
384 (1847) ; Low v. Knowlton, Id. 128
(1846); Partridgev. Luce, 36 Id. 16
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(1853) ; Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Id.
441 (1882).
The judicial constructions of the ordinance in that State accord, as far as
they go, with those of the courts of
Massachusetts, except that in Maine
low water-mark is taken to mean ordinary low water-mark: Gerrish v. Proprietorsof Union Wharf, supra.
In New Hampshire, the operative
effect of the ordinance of 1647 has
been introduced by force of custom.
There, as in Massachusetts and Maine,
the ownership of the riparian owner
extends over the tidal flats in front of
his land as far out as low water, if low
water is not more than 100 rods out:
Clement v. Burns, 43 N. H. 621 (1862).
In Connecticut, the title to the shore
below high water-mark is in the State,
but by local custom having the force
of law the riparian owner on tidewater, although he has no ownership
of adjacent tide flats, has the right to
fill in land or build wharves or docks
below high water-mark, provided he
does not thereby interfere with navigation: State v. Sargent, 45 Conn.
358 (1877); Mather v. Chapman, 40
Id.. 382 (1873). The riparian owner
has the exclusive right to wharf out
or to reclaim tidal flats adjacent to
his lands: East Haven v. Hemingway,
7 Conn. 186 (1828). This right is a
franchise, which may be alienated
separately from the adjoining upland:
Simons v. French, 25 Conn. 312 (1856).
But where the riparian owner grants
away a strip of the shore, adjoining high water-mark, he does not
reserve the right of filling in beyond
the strip: New Haven S. Co. v. Sargent, 50 Conn. 199 (1882). After the
riparian owner has reclaimed tidal
flats in exercise of his right, the title
to the land made or covered by the
structures built belongs to the riparian owner: East Haven v. Hemingway,
supra; Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn.

38, 42 (1831) ; Lockwood v. New York
4. New Haven R. R. Co., 37 Id. 387
(1870). Even when the filling is
done by a stranger the land belongs
to the riparian owner in front of whose
land the filling was made: Nichols v.
Lewis, 15 Conn. 137 (1842).
The
right of the riparian owner to wharf
out or reclaim land is subject to the
public rights of navigation, which
may be fixed and determined by harbor lines, limiting the right of the
riparian owner: State v. Sargent,
supra; Frink v. Lawrence, 20 Conn.
117 (1849).
In New Jersey, the law is similar
to that of Connecticut. As in Connecticut, the title of the riparian
owner stops at the high water-line:
Arnold v. Mundy, 1 Halst. 1, 10
(1821) ; Gough v. Bell, 22 N. J. L. 441
(1850) ; at which line the ownership
of the State commences: Id. As in Connecticut, the riparian owner has the
right to wharf out or make land below
high water-mark if he does not interfere with the public rights of navigation : Gough v. Bell, supra; Stevens v.
Pattersonand Newark R. R. Co., 34 N.
J. L. 532 (1870). As in Connecticut,
the riparian owner acquires title to
land which he makes in front of his
upland by filling in below high watermark. The State cannot authorize
the taking of land so made for a public use without due compensation to the
riparian owner: Gough v. Bell, supra;
Id. 3 Zabr. 670 (1852) ; Keyport Steamboat Co. v. Farmers' Transp. Co., 18 N.
J. Eq. 511 (1866). Butthelawof New
Jersey differs from the law of Connecticut in this: that while in Connecticut the right of the riparian owner is
a franchise, which he may alien separately from his upland, in New Jersey
the right of the riparian owner is regarded as a mere license from the
State, revocable by the State, until
exercised by him: Stevens v. Patterson
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and Newark R. R. Co., supra; .ctate
v. Jersey City, 1 Dutch. N. J. 525
(1856). Hence, at any time before the
riparian owner has actually reclaimed
or built improvements upon any part
of the shore adjacent to his land, the
State may grant that part of the shore,
so unimproved or unreclaimed, to a
third person, without any provision
for compensation to the riparian
owner. Such is the law as established
by the cases last cited and the recent
case of American Dock and Improvement
Co. v. Public School Trustees, 39 N.
J. Eq. 409 (1885), in spite of the
doubts raised by Bell v. Gough, 3 Zab.
670. The riparian owner has, it
seems, no right of damages against a
stranger occupying tidal flats in front
of his upland: Stewart v. FRich, 31 N.
J. L. 17 (1864). It is clear that he
cannot maintain ejectment in such a
case; but it has been intimated that
equity would grant an injunction in
favor of the riparian owner, as against
a stranger intruding without right
upon the adjacent tidal flats : King v.
Xorris 4" Essex R. R. Co., 18 N. J.
Eq. 397 (1867) ; Statev. Brown, 27 N.
J. L. 11 (1858). But see Stevens v.
Patterson 6- Newark R. R. Co., 20 N.
J. Eq. 126 (1869). In Bell v. Gough,
3.Zab. 658, ELMER, J., intimated that
the riparian owner might fill in land,
even below low water-mark, when he
can do so without interfering with
navigation.
In Rhode Island, as in Connecticut
and New Jersey, the title to the shore
is in the State, but the riparian owner
has the right to reclaim or occupy the
tidal flats in front of his land, provided he does not interfere with the
rights of navigation. This rests upon
an ancient statute: Steam Engine Co.
v. Steamship Co., 12 R. 1. 348, 363
(1879), opinion of PoTTER, J.; Gould
on Waters, § 172.
In Maryland and Oregon, there are
VoL. XXXVI.-102

statutory provisions authorizing riparian owners on tidal waters to fill in
tidal fiats adjacent to their lands:
Casey's Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill (Md.),
430, 501 (1844), referring to Statute
of 1745; Wilson's Lessees v. Inloes,
11 G. & J. 351 (1840); Parker v.
Rogers, 8 Oreg. 183 (1879). In Maryland, it is held that the title to land
made by the riparian owner is vested
in him: Wilson's Lessees v. Inloes, supra. And that where improvements
are made by a stranger, in front of the
land of a riparion owner, the title to
the improvements is in the riparian
owner: 31ayor, etc. v. St. Agnes Hospital, 48 Md. 419 (1877). Nevertheless, it seemed that the State could
grant the shore in front of a riparian
owner to a third person: Browne v.
Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195 (1821); until
the law was changed in this regard by
the Statute of 1862: Day v. Day, 22
Md. 530 (1865).
Under the Virginia Statute, the title
of the riparian own' r on tidal waters
is extended to the low water-mark:
French v. BankJead, 11 Gratt. 136
(1854). The Virginia Code of 1887,
Title 20, Chap. IX., also provides that
the riparian owner on any water-course
may wharf out as far as convenient,
provided he does not interfere with
navigation : City v. Cooke, 27 Gratt.
430, 438 (1876).
In Florida, the riparian owner on any
harbor or bay, being an arm of the sea,
or on any navigable stream, is given
title to the soil as far as to the edge of
the channel, with the right to erect
wharves or to fill in up to that limit:
Geiger v. Fllor, 8 Fla. 325, 339 (1859).
In California, the right of the riparian owner, on tidewater, to wharf
out or fill in, in front of his land, is
doubtful under the decisions: See
Coburn v. Ames, 52 Cal. 385 (1877);
Dana v. Jackson St. Wharf Co., 31 Id.
118 (1866). It is settled that a ripa-
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rian owner cannot bring ejectment to
gain possession of a wharf erected by
a stranger in front of his land, between
high and low water: Coburn v. Ames,
supra. It is there held that the State
is the proper party to bring the suit
in ejectment in such a case, and that
assuming the right of the riparian
owner to wharf out, his remedy
against a stranger wrongfully occupying the shore adjacent to his land
and interfering with his right of
wharfing out was by a bill in equity.
In New York, the English common
law as to the ownership of the shore
of tidal waters is in full force. The
ownership of the shore is vested in
the State as the successor of the
crown, and the riparian owners have
no rights in or over it, except the
rights of navigation and fishing,
which they possess in common with
the general public,, and not by reason
of their riparian ownership: Lansing
v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9 (1829) ; Gould v..
Hudson River R. I. Co., 6 N. Y. 522
(1852); People v. Tibbetts, 19 Id.
523 (1869). The State may cause the
riparian owner to lose his adjacency
to the water by filling in or authorizing another to fill in the tidal fiats in
front of the riparian owner's land:
Gould v. Hudson River R. R. Co.,
supra. The riparian owner is entitled
to no compensation in such a case :
Id. But see dissenting opinion of
EDMONns, J. In Lansing v. Smith,
supra, the Court say that any structure erected by a riparian owner
below high water-line would be a
purpresture, and abatable as such.
See People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N. Y. 287
(1863), where a crib built in New
York harbor beyond the dock-line
was ordered abated.
SELDEN, J.,
bases his separate opinion on the
ground that the structure was a purpresture: See, also, People v. Centrul
R. R. of New Jersey, 48 Barb. (N.

Y.) 478 (1867), and 42 N. Y. 283
(1870). But, although the riparian
owner has no right to encroach upon
the State domain by wharves or docks,
and such structures, if erected on the
State domain, belong to the State,
nevertheless, until the State has
claimed its right and taken possession of them, the riparian owner may
assert his private right to such structures as against third persons. The
mere fact that such structures are on
State land does not make them free to
the public: Wetmore v. Brooklyn Gas
Light Co., 42 N. Y. 384 (1870).
In Pennsylvania, it is held that the
riparian owner on tidal waters owns
to low water-mark: Tinicum Fishing
Co. v. Carter,61 Penna. St. 21 (1869) ;
Ball v. Slack, 2 Whar. (Pa.) 508
(1837) ; Naglee v. Ingersoll, 7 Penna.
St. 185 (1847); Pdladelphia v. Scott,
81 Id. 80 (1876). In the first case
above cited it was held that the riparian owner had no right to wharf out
or reclaim land below high watermark without permission of the State.
It was held that the State might grant
the right to wharf out to the riparian
owner or to a stranger, but that in the
latter case the riparian owner's right
of access to the water must not be interfered with. In Philadelphiav. Scott,
supra, it was held that although the
State had the right to embank in front
of the land of a riparian owner, it
could not throw the expense of embanking onto the riparian owner. In
Vaglee v. Ingersoll, supra, and Zug v.
Commwnwealth, 70 Pa. St. 138 (1874),
cases of riparian ownership on nontidal water-courses, it was held that
the riparian owner owned to low watermark, and had the right to wharf out
to that line.
II. The rights of riparian owners
on non-tidal waters extend ad medium
aqumfilum.
The English definition of navigable
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waters, not tidal, has not been universally adopted in this country. The
definition of navigable waters, while
adapted to a small country like Enggland, few of whose rivers are navigable above the ebb and flow of the
tide, is quite inapplicable to our country, many of whose rivers are navigable hundreds and even thousands of
miles above tide: Popeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. (U. S.) 443
(1851). Accordingly, many of our
States have refused to be bound by
the English definition of navigable
rivers, and have extended the term so
as to cover fresh water rivers, which
were in fact navigable, and have applied to such rivers the rule of the
State ownership of the river bed, applied in England only to tidal waters.
Thus, in Iowa, it has been held that
the Mississippi was a navigable river,
as it flowed by that State and that,
consequently, the riparian owner's
title stopped, and that of the State
commenced at ordinary high watermark: Mc Manus v. Carmichael, 3
Iowa, 1 (1856). A similar decision
was made by the Supreme Court of
Missouri as to the Missouri River in
that State: Benson v. M1orrow, 61 Mo.
345 (1875). See also Railroad Co. v.
Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272 (1868) ; Schurmeir v. St. Paul R. R. Co., 10 Minn.
82, 102 (1865); St. Paul R. R. Co. v.
First Division R. R. Co., 26 Id. 31
(1879); Minto v. Ddancy, 7 Oreg. 337
(1879); Moore v. Willamette Transportation Co., 7 Id. 355, 356 (1879); Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev. 261 (1878);
Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682 (1882).
As to lakes and large ponds, the
prevailing current of authority has
uniformly set in favor of limiting the
riparian ownership at the high watermark, and maintaining the ownership
of the State below that line. As to
the great lakes, authority is almost
unanimous in favor of State owner-
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ship of the soil covered by water:
Canal Commissionersv. People, 5 Wend.
(N. Y.) 423 (1830) ; Sloan v. Biemiller,
34 Ohio St. 492 (1878); Seaman v.
Smith, 24 111. 521 (1860); Delaplaine
v. Chicago Railway Co., 42 Wisc. 214
(1877). But see Rice v. Ruddiman, 10
Mich. 125 (1862). The title to the
bed of Lake Champlain has also been
held to be in the State: Champlain R.
R. Co. v. Valentine, 19 Barb. (N. Y.)
484 (1853); Fletcher v. Phelps, 28 Vt.
257 (1856); Jakeway v. Barrett,38 Id.
316, 323 (1865).
What .rights in or over the submerged soil in front of their land
have owners of land bordering upon
public lakes, ponds, and fresh-water
rivers? The word public is used to
denote waters where there is held to
be a public ownership of the submerged soil. In the first place, it
seems to be nearly everywhere settled
that such an owner has the right to
wharf out in front of his land to navigable water, provided he does not by
so doing interfere with or hinder the
public right of navigation: Dutton v.
Strong, 1 Black. 23 (1861) ; Yates v.
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497 (1870); Atlee
v. Racket Co., 21 Id. 389 (1874) ; Grant
v. Davenport, 18 Iowa, 179 (1865);
Afusser v. Hershey, 42 Id. 356 (1876) ;
Rippe v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 23
Minn. 18 (1876) ; Diedrick v. N. W.
U. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248 (1877) ; Ddaplaine v. Chicago 4- N. W. Ry. Co.,
supra. How far out the riparian
owner may extend his wharf is a
practical question to be decided in
each case upon its special facts and
circumstances. In Dutton v. Strong,
supra, the court say that a wharf extending out into Lake Michigan several hundred feet is not necessarily a
nuisance. Chief Justice RYAN seems
to lay down the correct rule as to the
distance which the riparian owner
may wharf out. He says, in the case
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of Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 46
Wisc. 237, 244 (1879): "A pier upon
Lake Michigan, to aid navigation, must
go into water deep enough to be accessible to vessels navigating the lake.
A boom on a logging stream to aid
such navigation must go into water
deep enough to be accessible to floating logs, must be so constructed as to
receive and discharge floating logs.
In either case, to reach navigable
water, reasonably implies reaching it
with effect to accomplish this purpose,
the word often signifying some penetration of the thing reached. One is
not understood to stop outside the
limits of a place when he is said to
reach it. He is understood to enter
it as far as may be necessary for his
purpose. The right in question necessarily implies some intrusion into
navigable water, at peril of obstructThis intrusion is
ing navigation.
expressly permitted to aid navigation, and expressly prohibited to
obstruct navigation. It is impossible
to give a general rule limiting its
extent. That will always depend
upon the conditions under which the
right is exercised, the extent and
uses of the navigable water, the
nature and object of the structure
itself. A structure in aid of navigation, which would be a reasonable
intrusion into the waters of Lake
Michigan, would probably be an obstruction of navigation in any navigable river within the State. A logging boom which would be a reasonable intrusion into the waters of the
Mississippi would probably be an
obstruction of navigation in most or
all the logging streams within the
State. The width of a river may
justify a liberal exercise of the right
of intrusion, or may exclude it altogether. Its extent is purely a relative question." It is, perhaps, well
to call attention to the fact that the

rule laid down by Judge RYAN does
not make the obstruction of navigation the only limit upon the extent of
the riparian owner's right to wharf
out. He may wharf out far enough
to make his wharf accessible to vessels
such as navigate the water-course
where the wharf was built. But it is
not said that he may wharf out farther,
even although he might do so without
hindering or obstructing navigation;
and it would seem that he cannot
encroach any farther upon the public
domain than is necessary in constructing a wharf that will be fairly accessible.
Another right which riparian
owners upon public fresh water
rivers and lakes would seem to have
is the right to extend breakwaters
and embankments a reasonable distance into the water for the protection
of their property: Diedric v. Chicago
and Northwestern Ry. Co., supra. But
the riparian owner is not authorized
to encroach further than may be reasonably nceessary to secure adequate
protection for his land : Diedric v.
Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co.,
supra. In that case, the riparian
owner built a breakwater in Lake
Michigan in front of his land some
80 rods from shore, and filled in the
intervening space. It was held that
he had no right or title to the land
thus made; that while a riparian
owner was entitled to build a reasonable breakwater in front of his land,
he could not, on the pretence of protecting his land, encroach upon the
domain of the State.
The rights of the riparian owner
seem to be strictly limited to the two
rights of wharfing out to navigable
water and of constructing breakwaters
to protect his land. The case of
Diedrick v. Chicago and Northwestern
Ry. Co., cited above, is an authority
to the effect that the riparian owner
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has no right to make land in front of
his premises; and the case of Atlee
v. Packet Co., supra, decides that the
riparian owner has no right to erect
a structure in the water in front of
his land which is not connected with
the uses of navigation.
Under the law, then, the rights of
the riparian owners upon public fresh
water rivers and lakes would seem to
be well defined, and the limits of
those rights well established. As a
matter of fact, however, it is not
unusual, in many localities, for such
riparian owners to encroach upon the
submerged soil in front of their land
for purposes and to an extent quite
unwarranted by the law. Especially
has this been the case along the shores
of the great lakes. It is a common
practice for riparian owners along the
shores of the great lakes to extend
piers out from the shore to intercept
the sand carried by the currents which
run parallel to the shore, and thus
make land in front of the natural
shore line. If the practice of extending out short breakwater piers is to
be defended as the customary manner
of protecting land from encroachment
by the waters of the lakes, it seems,
on the other hand, that the building

out of long piers for the express purpose of making land is wholly indefensible. Nevertheless, many acres of
valuable property have been made by
enterprising riparian owners in just
this way. It seems a matter of grave
doubt if land so made becomes the
property of the riparlan owner.
The rule that the riparian owner is
entitled to accretions forming in front
of his land is of course quite familiar
to every one. But it has been held
that when the riparian owner himself causes the accretions by means
of an unlawful structure erected in
the water, the accretion thus formed
does not belong to him: Danav. Jackson St. Wharf Co., 31 Cal. 118 (1866).
See, also, Steers v. Brooklyn, 101 N.
Y. 51 (1885). It would seem that
title to land so made was in the State,
and not in the riparian owner. But
where the riparian owner makes land
by filling in the shoal water in front
of his shore, there can be no doubt
but the title to the land so made is in
the State, and not in him: DiedriHk
v. Chicago and Northwestern By. Co.,
42 Wis. 248. See Austin v. Butlaad
R. R. Co., 45 Vt. 215 (1873).
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